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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
instruct them thus: "The court instructs the jury that if, under the evi-
dence and under the other instructions given you by the court, you find de-
fendant guilty herein, then it is your duty under the law of this state, to
determine and to assess the punishment which the defendant herein shall
suffer; but the court further instructs you that if, under the evidence herein
and under the other instructions given you by the court, you find the de-
fendant guilty herein, but you are unable to agree upon the punishment to
be assessed, then you shall so state in your verdict, and in that event, but
not otherwise, the court will assess the punishment."
On the one hand it would seem that the jury should know the law under
which it is to function and hence that the instruction should be given before
the jury retires. Moreover, if the jurors knew that they did not absolutely
have to fix the punishment it would eliminate those cases in which a juror
refuses to find the accused guilty because the others think he should receive
a heavier penalty than this particular juror thinks he should. The one
question would be separate and distinct from the other. On the other hand
it seems that the instruction, given before the jury retires, would in some
measure defeat the purpose of the statute, which obviously is to have the
jury fix the punishment if possible and yet to prevent a mistrial if they
cannot agree. If the jury know from the first that they do not have to
fix the punishment the likelihood is greater that they will not do so.
In State v. Adams (Mo. 1929) 19 S. W. (2d) 671, the trial court gave
almost the exact instruction proposed and it was approved by the Supreme
Court of Missouri. However, the circumstances under which the instruc-
tion was given were as follows: The jury retired at 1:00 P. M. and at
3:20 P. M. announced that they had agreed on the guilt of defendant but
could not agree on the punishment. The court sent the jury back to de-
liberate further. They again returned at 3:50 P. M. and announced that
there was no possibility of agreeing on the punishment. The court then
gave the instruction. Hence the important question of the time at which
the instruction may be given has yet to be passed upon by the highest court
of the state. B. L. W., '31.
DEATH-IMPUTATION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AMONG PARENTS.-
The parents of a boy nineteen years old sued for his wrongful death caused
by defendant railroad. The sum asked was the maximum amount allowed
under the statute providing a penalty which is recoverable by the father
and mother, each of whom shall have an equal interest in the judgment, or
by the survivor, if either be dead. R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4217. The father's
negligence had contributed to the accident. Held, the father's negligence,
which would bar a judgment in his favor alone, should not be imputed to
the mother, and the full penalty should be recovered because there can be
no apportionment of damages. Herrell v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.
(Mo. 1929) 23 S. W. (2d) .102.
Many cases have held that the negligence of one parent which results in
injury to their children must be imputed to the other. O'Flaherty V. Union
Ry. Co. (1869) 45 Mo. 70; Darbinsky v. Pennsylvania Co. (1915) 248 Pa.
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503, 94 AtI. 269; Crevelli v. Chicago 11. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1917) 98 Wash.
42, 166 Pac. 66. But the more modern view seems to be that the marriage
relation is insufficient for the imputation of liability except where the negli-
gent person acted as agent for the other. Phillips v. Denver City Tramway
Co. (1912) 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460; Love v. Detroit, J. & C. R. Co. (1912)
170 Mich. 1, 135 N. W. 963; Macdonald v. O'Reilly (1904) 45 Ore. 589, 78
Pac. 753. In the light of the dissolution of the common-law unity of hus-
band and wife, the latter view seems preferable, and the Missouri court in
the principal case decided to adopt it and overrule its previous view.
O'Flaherty v. Union Ry. Co., above.
The decision that there could be no apportionment of damages seems to
be based almost entirely upon the fact that the statutory sum is described
as a penalty. The full amount was awarded despite the many cases in
other jurisdictions which abate the award to the extent of the interest of
persons contributorily negligent. This view seems to be accepted in all
other states where contributory negligence is considered a defense to the
statutory action and where the negligence of one parent is not to be im-
puted to the other. Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., above; Wolf v.
Lake Erie & W. R. Co. (1896) 55 Ohio St. 530, 45 N. E. 708; 8 R. C. L.
786; 17 C. J. 1244; 23 A. L. R. 670, 690. The opinion indicates that the
decision is based upon a desire to limit the application of the doctrine of
contributory negligence in statutory actions. The court does not assume
to overrule the previous cases under the statute in which contributory neg-
ligence has been a good defense; but because of its disapproval of the
principle, refuses to apply it to facts not clearly covered by the decisions.
The court might have justified the result it reached by completely reversing
its former position and holding that in an action for a statutory penalty
contributory negligence is no defense. McKay v. Syracuse Rapid Transit
R. Co. (1913) 208 N. Y. 359, 101 N. E. 885; Wilmot v. McPadden (1905)
78 Conn. 276, 61 Atl. 1069; Watson v. Southern R. Co. (1903) 66 S. C. 47,
44 S. E. 375. Absent such a basis, the decision lacks both logic and
authority. J. A. G., '31.
JUDGMENTS-EFFnCT OF FAILURE TO SERVE ALL JOINT DEFENDANTS.-
Three defendants were sued as joint tort-feasors, but only one was served.
Plaintiff proceeded to judgment without dismissing as to the two not
served. On appeal the judgment was declared void as against all defend-
ants. Cunningham v. Franke (Mo. A. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 106. The de-
cision was put on the ground that it did not settle the rights of all parties
to the action, and that R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4223, which provides for con-
tribution among joint tort-feasors, would give defendants properly served
rights against the other defendants without service on them, unless this
result was reached.
A number of cases follow what seems to be the more conservative view
in holding that failure of service against some joint defendants causes the
judgment to be void against all. Boutwell v. Grayson (1918) 118 Miss. 80,
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